



The Political Economy of Euro-African Fishing Agreements

Author(s): Okechukwu C. Iheduru

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Oct., 1995), pp. 63-90

Published by: [College of Business, Tennessee State University](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4192520>

Accessed: 18/11/2011 18:15

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



College of Business, Tennessee State University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Journal of Developing Areas*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

The Political Economy of Euro-African Fishing Agreements

OKECHUKWU C. IHEDURU

Over the past two decades there have been a series of agreements between the European Union (EU)¹ and several African coastal states granting access to the latter's pelagic fisheries resources to European fishermen. Proponents of these agreements present them not only as an optimal strategy for the sustainable management of these natural resources, but also as a means of transferring technology and furthering the economic development of the African signatory countries. Other studies, however, condemn these agreements as another opportunity for exploitation and for fostering the continued dependence of African countries on Europe. More specifically, the agreements allegedly have had for Africa only negative results—namely, overfishing, undernourishment, and undercompensation.²

Most of these scholarly debates on the merits or drawbacks of these agreements for African states are now dated, and with the deepening economic crises in Africa since the late 1970s and the growing crises in world fisheries, it is important to reexamine the agreements in the light of Africa's quest for alternative development strategies in the less friendly post-Cold War period. In addition, some of the agreements have been reworked and renewed, supposedly to respond to many of the criticisms of the earlier pacts and to reflect current trends in the development debate. A number of extant studies also tend to be country-specific, or focused on one subregion of Africa.³ More important, studies of the role of

Assistant Professor of International Relations, James Madison College, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48825-1205.

An earlier version of this article was presented as "Euro-African Fishing Agreements: Development Strategy or Exploitation" at the Scholars' Conference on Africa and the New World Order, 10–12 March 1994, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, AR.

The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor of the *JDA* for their suggestions, which significantly improved the quality of this article.

fisheries in the development process in Africa have been carried out mostly by economists and biologists, who frequently avoid the “messy” political dimensions of their subject.⁴ This paper seeks to fill some of these gaps by examining the political and economic dimensions of these agreements so as to ascertain their benefits and shortcomings in the light of the present “stage” or phase of Africa’s economic and technological development and its place in the global order.

The central argument underlining this reexamination is that the political economy of the Euro-African fishing agreements does not augur well for growth and development in Africa, and it is especially not conducive to the sustainable management of Africa’s marine resources. That is, the fishing agreements are motivated by the convergence of Europe’s demand for fish and the profit-making desires of European fishing companies, on one hand; and the desire by local African political elites to respond to economic crisis and to use their control over the industry for personal enrichment and political patronage (except in a few countries), on the other.⁵ Even where the agreements would have contributed to development, this political economy guarantees that any such benefits will not be equitably distributed. This study will also seek to demonstrate that in those cases where data are available (not counting the exceptions in note 4), the content and implementation of the fishing agreements do not always measure up to their other advertised goal of optimal management of the resources. Hence, one of the objectives of the present study is to articulate alternative strategies (and/or modified versions of existing ones) that could lead to sustainable management of Africa’s fisheries.

The remainder of this article will explore the preceding assertions in the following order. Section 1 examines the theoretical assumptions on which the Euro-African fishing agreements are based. It also discusses their limitations, which derive mainly from the interactions between economic dependency, technological backwardness, and capital scarcity in African countries. Section 2 considers the historical, economic, and political backgrounds to the fishing agreements, while section 3 examines the content of these agreements. In line with the issues raised earlier, section 4 focuses in greater detail on an evaluation of the implementation and implications of these agreements for the sustainable development of Africa’s pelagic fisheries as well as for an economic development that would benefit the majority of the people in the region. Section 5 suggests several innovative ways to manage Africa’s fisheries resources to ensure their sustainable exploitation, and section 6 completes the study with a summary and some conclusions.

Euro-African Fishing Agreements in Theoretical Perspective

Current fishing agreements between the EU and Africa, and between developing coastal states and distant-water fishing nations (DWFNs), in general trace their origins to the mid-1960s, when newly independent countries began to assert their rights over the natural resources within their borders that had hitherto been freely accessible to the developed countries, most of whom were colonial powers. Up to the late 1970s the political economy of global fisheries production and trade

had been shaped by the four conventions codifying ocean law signed in Geneva in 1958, particularly the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; by a large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements; and by formal and informal actions and the accumulation of customary practices of the traditional maritime nations. On attaining independence, these new states helped transform the 1958 Convention to a point where virtually all major coastal states unilaterally extended their jurisdictions over marine resources out to 200 miles from their coastlines. They referred to these jurisdictions as “exclusive economic zones” (EEZs). These unilateral actions were later incorporated into the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which came into force in 1983. UNCLOS III enhanced the *juridical* power and status of coastal states by giving them authority over the fisheries resources in their EEZs, with other nations having a right to these stocks only under special conditions. Most coastal states have since passed laws to legalize these claims.⁶

Given the previous control of the international trade in fisheries products by developed countries, most developing coastal states assumed that this new dispensation would enable them to capture a large share of that lucrative trade and to use the benefits to accelerate their economic development if they asserted exclusive use rights over their pelagic fisheries. The declaration of EEZs and extended fisheries jurisdictions (EFJs) by coastal states in the 1970s and 1980s was also based on the assumption that such actions would result in the expansion of their production possibilities in the industry. Some economists argued that “with strengthened property rights in the ocean resources off its shores, a coastal nation experiences increased opportunities to produce goods and services from its newly enlarged pool of resources.”⁷ Lee G. Anderson also suggested that through more efficient use of resources which prior to the declaration of the EFJs were characterized by open access (or “common property”) conditions, a coastal state could now increase its production possibilities.⁸

These assumptions were apparently oblivious to the disadvantages that the developing coastal states faced if they insisted on exclusive use rights over their fisheries. Practical impediments such as an absence of resources, the low level of previous regional cooperation (which UNCLOS III indeed recommends as a strategy for effective enforcement of the new fisheries regimes), and the virtual lack of experience in industrial fishing in these countries (especially in Africa) could hinder—and may already have hindered—the full realization by coastal states of the anticipated benefits of EEZs and EFJs.⁹ The euphoric reactions also ignored the possibility that terms-of-trade effects could result in the expected gains being converted into losses since most of the fish caught would be exported to the industrialized countries, and fish as a commodity export would face the same problems confronted by other commodity exports from developing countries. Hence, George Kent warns:

It is an illusion to believe that [fishing] can be as rewarding to the less developed countries as it has been to the developed countries. The poorer countries may gain control over the waters, and they may even become engaged in the fishing and in some processing, but if they are to operate on the world market, they will inescapably be dependent on the richer countries. The richer countries would be

capable of squeezing the poorer countries in specific negotiations, and the general trend of inflation would tend to make the earnings less and less valuable.¹⁰

The paradox of juridical power without capability ignited a lot of debate about the optimal strategy to manage these fisheries resources in the new political environment. Advocates of the law of comparative advantage suggested that countries that are better endowed with certain resources and that can produce certain goods more efficiently should trade their goods for other items produced more efficiently by other countries. This exchange would have a general welfare effect. Some even suggested that the existing pattern of world trade in fishery products was reasonable because although the fishery products tend to flow from poor to rich, there is in return a flow of payments from rich to poor in the form of access rents, technology transfers, enhanced capacity to efficiently manage these resources, and so on.¹¹

In Africa, the coastal countries were encouraged to grant access to DWFNs having the capital, technology, and possibly labor to engage in more “efficient” exploitation of these resources, and simply to use their rents from licenses to attend to some of their most pressing developmental needs. Through the licensing of DWFN fleets, it is contended, the developing coastal states would benefit from fishing without actually doing the fishing themselves. According to one view, “if costs of production, harvesting, and/or marketing are lower for the distant water fleet(s) than for the coastal country, over some range of output, all participants could gain if the coastal country ‘imported’ those services in which it has a comparative disadvantage.”¹² Richard S. Johnston and James R. Wilson further argue that managerial services could be more effectively provided by foreign nations than by the coastal state, especially if the visitor shared in the resulting rent and thus had an incentive to manage the resource optimally.¹³ As Stephen Crutchfield asserts, owing to favorable endowments of capital and labor, mobility (or malleability) of capital, preferred access to markets, and the like, foreign fleets may offer decided advantages to coastal countries with new EEZs.¹⁴

Many coastal states did not accept the comparative advantage theory because, according to Kent, “the economic advantages which accrue to some nations are only marginally due to their special endowments of natural resources. . . . The really significant advantages which certain nations enjoy are their advantages in capital and technology or, more generally, their wealth.”¹⁵ Also, the advantages of capital and technology are not distributed haphazardly or in accordance with natural endowments, but are themselves the effects of earlier patterns of advantage and disadvantage. Moreover, there abounds a myriad of studies in the radical literature that blames Africa’s disadvantaged condition on its colonial history.¹⁶ Having recently won their freedom, some of these African countries were not willing to relinquish their marine resources to the operation of the law of comparative advantage, which many increasingly associated with the perpetuation of their dependent and neocolonial status.

This sensitivity to years of past and continuing exploitation precluded wholesale acceptance of the comparative advantage thesis by African coastal states.¹⁷ Consequently, many of them settled for a short-term solution, that is, the liberal development strategy of “import-substitution” industrialization predicated on

cooperation with, and technology transfers from, the traditional foreign fishing nations. Rather than rely on economic rents from access to fisheries under the comparative advantage regime, the developing coastal states entered into various bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements ranging from fee fishing to joint ventures as a means not only of obtaining rent but also of acquiring the technology and the know-how to harness their fisheries to their own advantage in the long run. According to Lewis E. Queirolo and Richard S. Johnston, this ushered in “an era in which coastal countries [began to] compete for opportunities to cooperate with distant water fleets in their own EEZs [and] distant water nations [also began to] engage in rivalry for access to the new economic zone.”¹⁸

These circumstances explain why, since the late 1970s, many developing African coastal states began to trade their initial exclusive use-rights preferences for various cooperative, bilateral, and multilateral arrangements to make up for their deficiencies in technological, resource, and managerial capabilities. These arrangements have also helped the DWFNs to regain at least partial access to the fisheries they had lost in the frenzy of EEZ declarations in the early 1970s. By the mid-1980s a consensus had emerged that some foreign participation may make sound economic sense to the coastal country, even in the long term.¹⁹ In Africa, important foreign fishing nations included the former Soviet Union (now replaced by Russia), South Korea, and the European Community (now EU).²⁰ The relative ease with which the DWFNs regained access to the EFJs has been as dramatic as the vigor with which these jurisdictions were extended in the 1970s and 1980s, suggesting that the euphoria generated was probably a wholly misplaced faith in the extension of juridical power as a panacea for the developing countries’ marine dependency. The greatest gains in EFJs, some have argued, still go to developed countries, which, given their greater capacities, are able to draw more benefit from each square mile of extended jurisdiction than the less-developed countries that juridically own them.²¹

The political economy of Euro-African fishing relations reflects these dynamics, in addition to a number of specific external and domestic constraints that have compelled African countries to enter into these agreements. First, there are tariff and other artificial market entry barriers that prevent African entrepreneurs from penetrating European markets.²² Second, there is an array of nontariff barriers that includes lack of knowledge of market and distribution outlets for fishery products, lack of access to appropriate industrial fishing technology, lack of familiarity with product promotion, and lack of investment capital. Within Africa itself, low income and low demand for fishery products are major constraints to large-scale development of the sector for the local market, although these factors are equally major indicators of poverty and underdevelopment. Finally, economic dependency, especially of Francophone African countries, has led to a high proportion of the fish trade being accomplished through monetary transfers between the CFA franc zone and metropolitan France, which has for more than 50 years constrained the economic independence of these countries.

Increased dependency on fishing rents and foreign fishing technology in highly centralized state systems has also resulted in the politicization of access to fishery resources. Licenses and financial compensation, for example, are often

used to advance patrimonial state structures within some African coastal states.²³ Today, Africa has achieved neither self-sufficiency in seafood production, nor the generation of large revenues from access rents and licenses for its fisheries. Ironically, Africans today import most of their fish from Europe and Asia, whose fishing companies exploit and (mis)manage most of Africa's pelagic fisheries resources.²⁴ In the sections that follow, the extent to which these external and domestic forces have conditioned the policy options available to African countries in the fisheries sector are discussed.

Background to Euro-African Fishing Agreements

The decline in global fish production resulting from the introduction of new technologies and overfishing forced most countries to view access to the world fisheries as a zero-sum game, a situation that gave rise to marine fisheries nationalism in the 1960s and early 1970s, especially among the industrial states.²⁵ In Europe, the devastation of stocks exacerbated the EU fishing fleet's gross overcapacity problem by more than 40 percent, creating more competition.²⁶ This was particularly true at the time when Spain and Portugal were yet to join the EU, both countries having more access to African fisheries than other European countries.²⁷ Largely unheeded calls were made for a revision of the EU's fisheries policy, which at the time even encouraged this type of marine nationalism.²⁸ Rather than deal with this problem, the countries involved sought alternative sources of fishery products. Thus, fishing agreements were negotiated between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states as an important component of the Lomé Convention on multilateral relations between these countries.

Another motivation for these treaties for the EU was the perceived threat from the former Soviet Union, whose vessels dominated the distant water fishing fleets, particularly in West Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. This, however, must be viewed as an extension of the East-West conflict, as a 1984 report by EU Member of Parliament Oliver d'Ormesson (officially known as the "D'Ormesson Report") demonstrates. The report, among other things, identified several benefits accruable to the EU from a coordinated West African policy:

First, the presence of the Soviet Union and its allies in the region could be partially balanced by an increased EC role in West African fishery affairs. The Soviet Union is the major foreign fishing nation in the region in terms of quantity of catch, while Romania, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland rank third, fourth, and fifth, respectively. These countries have also concluded a number of fishery agreements with West African nations.

The EC, on the other hand, harvests a relatively limited catch in the region, and only France ranks among the top ten foreign fishing nations there by quantity of catch. With the addition of Spain and Portugal, however, the EC would comprise the region's second largest foreign fishing group by volume and the most important by value. . . . The increased EC participation in the region could act to balance the presence and influence of the Soviet bloc countries.²⁹

Indeed, the total volume of fish caught by the East bloc in West Africa in 1982 was almost two-thirds of the region's total fish production as the 1982 data in table 1 reveal. Although the Soviet Union's more than 1.844 million metric tons

of fish caught in Africa in 1982, as in other years, were composed of mostly smaller low-value pelagic species, when combined with that of other East bloc nations, their total catch was seen as a serious threat to EU members. According to table 1, for all the DWFNs only Spain's catch came anywhere close to that of the Soviet Union, although it must be added that the Spanish catch was greater in value because it was made up largely of such high-value fish as tuna, cephalopods, crustaceans, and hake. The story is equally true of total catch distribution in other African fisheries. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the former USSR, Spain, Japan, and Taiwan were the dominant actors in Africa's fisheries in the Southeast Atlantic area, taking together 40.3 percent, 34.6 percent, and 42.9 percent of the Southeast Atlantic total nominal catch for all nations in 1991, 1990, and 1989, respectively (see table 2).

The anticommunist rhetoric in the D'Ormesson Report and other similar documents also disguised the EU's fears over the enforcement of the 200-mile offshore limits announced by some West African countries in a region where the Europeans had traditionally fished without any hindrance.³⁰ It also reflected the concern over their grossly depleted fisheries. For instance, since the 1980s, Germany, which has a short coastline, has been able to meet only 20 percent of its local fish consumption requirements, while the other 80 percent is imported, and demand and consumption have increased with the rise in the incomes of the general population.³¹

During the negotiations between the EU and the ACP-associated states at the Lomé II Convention in 1979, the EU convinced the ACP states to agree to a multilateral fishing arrangement in which the EU would negotiate *as a bloc* with individual ACP states and a fishing quota would be granted to the EU for allocation to the fishing companies of its members.³²

TABLE 1
EAST CENTRAL ATLANTIC AND SOUTHEAST ATLANTIC CATCHES
BY DISTANT WATER FISHING NATIONS, 1982
(In Thousands of Metric Tons)

COUNTRY	AFRICAN AREA CATCH		TOTAL
	Western	Southern	
USSR	956	888	1,844
Spain	444	208	652
Romania	84	81	165
German Democratic Republic	95	31	126
Poland	—	98	98
Republic of Korea	86	—	86
Japan	30	53	83
France	59	—	59
Bulgaria	7	50	57
Portugal	12	13	25
Other	42	13	55
Total	1,815	1,435	3,250

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), *FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, 1982* (Rome: FAO, 1982).

TABLE 2
NOMINAL CATCHES (TONS) IN SOUTHEAST ATLANTIC: FOREIGN FLAGS

Foreign Flag	1991	% of 1991	1990	% of 1990	1989	% of 1989
Former USSR	394,221	30.0	310,931	21.5	654,283	31.2
Spain	93,103	7.0	142,309	9.8	195,638	9.3
Japan	31,686	2.4	36,344	2.5	41,158	1.9
Taiwan ^a	11,290	0.9	11,798	0.8	9,454	0.5
Bulgaria	8,513	0.7	8,513	0.6	43,705	2.1
Korea Republic	5,436	0.4	5,984	0.4	2,366	0.1
Portugal	1,200	0.1	1,199	0.1	26,154	1.3
France	1,116	0.1	—	—	—	—
Cuba	—	—	11,766	0.8	29,447	1.4
Germany	—	—	16,123	1.1	28,513	1.4
Israel	—	—	2,875	0.2	6,170	0.3
Italy	—	—	—	—	4,726	0.2
Romania	—	—	11,589	0.8	56,633	2.7
Other	40	0.0	4	0.0	—	—
Total foreign	546,605	41.6	559,435	38.6	1,098,247	52.4
Domestic flags ^b	767,927	58.4	887,665	61.4	998,102	47.6
Total all nations	1,314,532	100.0	1,447,100	100.0	2,096,349	100.0

SOURCE: *Fishing Industry Handbook: South Africa and Namibia 1994* (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Marine Information cc, 1994), p. 76.

^aListed by the FAO as Other because the United Nations does not recognize Taiwan.

^bOf these totals, South African flags caught 37.6, 36.8, and 32.0 percent during the corresponding years, while Namibians caught 15.6, 17.7, and 10.6 percent. The only other domestic flags were Angolans, who caught 5.1, 6.8, and 4.9 percent for the corresponding years. St. Helena, the other flag, took just 0.1 percent of the region's nominal catch for the three years.

The Content of the Euro-African Fishing Agreements

The first of the Euro-African fishing agreements—often referred to as “first-generation” agreements—was signed with Senegal in the late 1970s. The tempo increased radically in the 1980s, and since the 1990s it has become the norm in the fishing industry for African coastal states to enter into such agreements. (See table 3 for some of these agreements and the years in which they were signed.)

Despite all official declarations, the aim of these agreements is “primarily to secure access for EC vessels to fishing grounds lying in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Coastal ACP countries.”³³ As noted earlier, the agreements generally fall into two categories: the “first generation” (from about 1979–1985) and the most recent ones (since 1985). The first-generation agreements were essentially “money for access” pacts³⁴ that covered (1) the level of fisheries access to be allowed EU fishermen; (2) the level of financial remuneration to be granted to the coastal state for this access; and (3) the levels of future access, which were to be based on the past or existing fishing activities of EU member states' fleets in the EEZ of the countries concerned. Very little, however, was done to deal with the problem of depletion of the fisheries, much less how coastal states could benefit in other ways in addition to financial compensation.

In response to these kinds of criticisms, the EU in the 1990s introduced a variety of provisions that, in principle, go beyond commercial fishing and include other development objectives as well.³⁵ A typical second-generation agreement would thus include the following:

TABLE 3
EURO-AFRICAN FISHING AGREEMENTS

Country	Date of Initial Agreement	Renewals/Remarks
Senegal	1979	1984; 1 May 1990–30 April 1992;
Guinea-Bissau	27 February 1980–1989	16 June 1991–15 June 1993; new renewal talks broken off 31 March 1995
Guinea	1983–8 July 1989	
Equatorial Guinea	1984; 27 June 1986–1992	New protocol 1989
São Tomé and Príncipe	1983–31 May 1990	1992
Seychelles	1984	1985–1989; 18 January 1990–17 January 1993
Madagascar	1986–1991	1992
Mozambique	11 December 1986–31 December 1991	Automatic renewal
Mauritania	May 1987–30 April 1989	May 1989–30 June 1990
Angola	3 May 1986–2 May 1990	1993
The Gambia	1987–1990	
Comoros	1988–1990 + 2 years	1994–1997
Gabon	1988–14 April 1991	
Morocco	1988–29 February 1992	1992–1996
Sierra Leone	1990–1992	Signed, but not yet in force
Mauritius	1 December 1990	
Tanzania	1990	
Namibia	1992 (talks suspended)	

SOURCE: *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series) (various years from 1980 to 1995); *Official Journal of the European Communities* (various years from 1980 to 1995); and FAO, *Coastal State Requirements for Foreign Fishing*, Legislative Study No. 21, Rev. 4 (Rome: FAO, 1993), pp. 137–246.

NOTE: This table is by no means an exhaustive and up-to-date listing of all the fishing agreements between the EU and Africa and their renewals. It is intended as an indicator of the trend in the agreements that now involve almost all coastal African states. The *Official Journal of the European Communities* usually contains the full texts of all fishing agreements (and renewals) between the EU and ACP states.

- commitment to rational exploitation of the fishery resource;
- contribution to rural and industrial development through local landing of fish harvests;
- obligation of EU fishing companies to recruit nationals of the African coastal state as crew members on the fishing vessels;
- provision of vocational training for nationals of the coastal state to study different aspects of fisheries in an EU or ACP state;
- funding/financing of scientific and technical programs to improve information on fishery resources;
- payment of financial compensation by the EU *as a bloc* to a coastal state for granting access to EU fishing companies as well as license fees to be charged for individual EU vessels; and
- penalties for infringement of fishing regulations.

These provisions also contain certain technical measures for monitoring and controlling fishing activities such as zoning provisions, transshipment regulations,

obligatory reporting of specifications (e.g., catch statements, etc.), compulsory inspection provisions, the presence of scientific observers on fishing vessels, mesh-size regulations for nets, and by-catch regulations. Interestingly, most of the pacts entrust the enforcement of the agreements to the EU or to the EU fishing companies eventually awarded the licenses.³⁶

In general, these agreements do not exclude the existence of separate or private agreements between African and individual European countries alongside the general ones negotiated by the EU. Also, like most EU “common policies,” their terms often make exceptions for preexisting Euro-African fishing arrangements. For instance, there is the Senegal-Spain agreement; the agreements between Portugal and Angola and Guinea-Bissau; and numerous agreements between France and some of its former colonies. Theoretically, it would appear that the “second-generation” agreements are a significant improvement upon the earlier ones, especially because the role of fisheries in national development is configured to be more than the production of cash payments. They also appear, at first sight, to be very comprehensive in their coverage and solid in their foundation. A careful and more reflective analysis, however, raises some fundamental questions about the impact of these agreements on the development prospects of the fisheries sector in Africa and the possibility of achieving sustainable fisheries development considering the goals of European countries in these agreements.

Euro-African Fishing Agreements: A Preliminary Evaluation

The costs and benefits of these treaties for African countries can be measured by using the declared objectives of the fishing agreements. They are financial compensation, rational exploitation of resources, rural and industrial development, employment and training of local personnel, and funding of scientific and technical programs. Space limitation precludes an evaluation of every agreement under the preceding criteria; consequently, this analysis will be limited to the most important cases as typical of the political economy of Euro-African international relations.

Financial Compensation. According to the World Bank, the primary objective of fisheries resource management should be to maximize the amount of rent by controlling the inputs of capital and labor. Governments should necessarily receive revenues to cover the costs of management, including those for research and enforcement of marine policy.³⁷ This has become a widespread practice to the extent that financial compensation for fishing access has become a *sine qua non* for state supervision of access and use of these resources. The general economic decline and poverty in Africa in the last decade, however, have driven this “financial logic” to its limits in some countries where the state appears simply to have collected access rent and done little supervision. As table 4 shows, several countries have received comparatively substantial rents from these agreements. A more careful analysis of these financial payments, however, shows that the ratio of the total rent paid by the EU compared to the value of the catches made by foreign fishing companies weighs heavily against those African countries that have signed these agreements.

TABLE 4
TERMS OF EURO-AFRICAN FISHING AGREEMENTS

COUNTRY	EU PAYMENTS (US\$1,000)				MAXIMUM FISHING EFFORT	
	Annual	Other	Vessel Fees (US\$/GRT/ Year) ^a	Fishing Fees (US\$/Ton)	Capacity (Average GRT) ^a	Number of Vessels
Senegal	7,600	247	21	18	26,000	–
Guinea-Bissau	1,300	220	97	18	7,000	–
Guinea-Conakry	616	176	97	18	3,000	50
Equatorial Guinea	158	–	–	18	–	27
São Tomé	2,430	35	–	–	–	48
Seychelles	265	–	–	18	–	18
Mozambique	4,816	2,128			2,499	–
Tanzania	1,120	706			7,000	54
Côte d'Ivoire	6,720	4,032				
Mauritius	448	706				
Madagascar	756	392			11,000	27
Mauritania	33,228	–				63

SOURCE: *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series) (various years from 1980 to 1995).

^aGRT = gross registered ton.

A detailed analysis of three African countries—Senegal, Madagascar, and Seychelles—will amplify the preceding observation (see table 5). Under the 1990–92 EU-Senegal protocol, Senegal received about US \$37.5 million from the EU, including financial compensation of \$33.6 million from the EU budget and a sum of \$4.1 million from European shipowners corresponding to a fee of \$22.4 per metric ton of tuna fished. The agreement allowed trawlers up to a total capacity of 30,600 deadweight tons (dwt) to catch the equivalent of \$84 million worth of fish. The total value of fish catch allowed is double the total amount of rent payable to Senegal from the fishing agreement.

Another example of unequal exchange in these agreements is the three-year 1989–92 agreement between the EU and Madagascar that allowed 45 EU tuna vessels to operate in Malagasy waters for a maximum catch of 12,000 tons of tuna per year. In return, for the duration of the accord Madagascar received US \$3.5 million, out of which \$3.2 million was compensation for fishing rights. According to a report released by the European Court of Auditors in January 1994, the value of the total EU fish catch in Malagasy waters was \$13.4 million, compared to the \$3.5 million the country earned. One may be tempted to conclude that this country

TABLE 5
FISHERIES RENT AND GDP OF SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES
(In Millions of 1985 U.S. Dollars)

COUNTRY	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT			FISHERIES RENT FROM EU
	1990	1991	1992	
Senegal	3,027	3,058	3,131	37.5
Madagascar	3,273	3,063	3,054	3.5
Seychelles	226	224	227	13.4

SOURCE: African Development Bank, *African Development Report 1993* (Abidjan: African Development Bank, 1993); and *African Business*, February 1994.

benefits from the protocol since it apparently receives one-quarter of the value of the catch as compensation. This figure, however, reflects only the landed or reported catch, and *not* the total catch.

For Seychelles, the ratio of rent to total value of fish to be caught by EU fishermen is even smaller. During the 1990–93 period, it earned about US 13.4 million from its agreement with the EU, out of which \$11.1 million was financial compensation from the EU budget. The reported total fish caught, however, was estimated at \$75 million, which means that Seychelles earned just 18 percent of the value of the reported catch made in its waters by EU fishing fleets.³⁸

As a percentage of the annual gross domestic products (GDP) of these countries, the fishing rents are also quite substantial, as may be inferred from table 5. Nonetheless, the real loss to Africa in this sector does not justify the fanfare that often heralds the signing of these agreements. In fact, the ratios just indicated would be much smaller if the actual total catch were landed in the coastal state or declared by the fishing companies, or if the fish caught by EU-based poachers were taken into account.

Worse still, some EU fishermen have traditionally overfished with impunity in some of the region's fisheries, with the result that most of the fisheries are on the brink of collapsing. The EU's response to reduced quotas since the 1990s has been a marked reduction by the EU of the total compensation package it is willing to pay to African countries. For instance, under the new agreement between the EU and Mauritania covering the period from 1 August 1993 to 31 July 1996, the EU reduced its financial compensation from the US \$32.5 million in the preceding agreement to \$29 million because the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of Mauritania's fisheries was revised downward. The same is true of the current EU-Madagascar agreement, which shows a reduction in its financial compensation to \$2.4 million from \$3.2 million owing to a reduction in the MSY of the country's tuna catch from 12,000 tons to 9,000 tons. The same fate befell Comoros in early 1995, when the European Parliament reportedly approved the renewal of the fishing agreement between the EU and the island nation, but reduced the EU's financial compensation to Comoros from ECU 900,000 (about \$1.02 million) to ECU 675,000 (about \$880,000) over three years. Again, this action was due to a reduction (from 42 to 37) in the number of fishing vessels authorized to operate in the Comoros EEZ.³⁹ Only Morocco and Senegal, in the whole of Africa, were able to obtain an upward revision of their rent despite a downward revision of the total allowable catch (TAC) in their respective fisheries.⁴⁰ Even if one accepts the suggestion that fishing rents have had a positive impact on the national budgets of some of Africa's coastal states, that fact would not invalidate the assertion that the rents are low relative to the value of the *total* fish catch. Instead, one can make a strong case for the claim of continuing undercompensation of African countries for the fisheries access they have granted to Europeans.

Very often the rents collected do not filter down to the people, especially those whose livelihood depends on fishing and who have been dislocated in the aftermath of these agreements, a result discussed later in this study.⁴¹ Only a few countries plow back some of the receipts from this sector into the industry to

benefit artisanal fishers. In most others, the rent ends up in the central government treasury, from where it is allocated to more pressing demands such as civil service pay and food imports that are often used to placate the state's urban-based supporters or opponents. The inadequacy and patrimonial appropriation of these financial compensations were recently denounced by the European Commission, the executive arm of the EU, which noted that

the existing financial compensation arrangements are little more than institutionalised corruption: financial compensation per se is seen as the "bribe" to the Ministry of Finance; scientific and technical cooperation funds are seen as the "bribe" to the Ministry of Fisheries; the bursaries programme is seen as a "bribe" to all senior Ministers and Officials who can use it to send favoured friends and relations on all expenses paid training junkets to Europe.⁴²

Commitment to "Rational Exploitation" of Marine Resources. The propagation of new management regimes for world fisheries has become common since the early 1980s. The EU Common Fisheries Policy of 1983, for example, sought to establish a "maximum sustainable yield" (MSY) by vesting primary responsibility for the management of fish stocks found in the 200-mile zones of its member states on the EU.⁴³ Consequently, future EU-ACP fishing agreements were designed such that a "rational exploitation" regime (perhaps a misnomer) was made part of the pacts. To its credit, this new strategy or its rhetoric has, indeed, led to a reduction of the "divide-and-conquer" schemes adopted by various European fishing companies and their national governments shortly after 1960 which exposed the vulnerability of poor African governments but ensured access to fishery products for Europe. Deliberate efforts to attain sustainable development of fishery resources have become popular, or, at least, the rhetoric to achieve it is on the increase.

In reality, however, rational fisheries management regimes—no matter how ingeniously crafted—have been the most violated and abused parts of the treaty provisions by both EU-based fishing companies and EU poachers, sometimes with the connivance of their national governments as well as by fisheries officials in Africa.

The EU may not be liable for these piratical activities; however, it has the power and resources to stop them, or to call the pirates to order considering that it is in its interest to do so. It is difficult to accept that the EU is committed to managing these resources judiciously and in a sustainable manner. Europe's primary motivation appears to be bigger profits from cheap and poached fish, a course of action that in the long run will hurt the European countries as they devastate one fishery after another. By easily giving in to pressure from fishing industry groups, the EU and its member states have clearly been undermining their treaty commitments to ensure sustainable use and careful management of those African pelagic fisheries upon which Europeans ironically depend a great deal.

Rural and Industrial Development through Local Landing of the Fish Catch. The objective of the landing provisions in the fishing agreements is to ensure a supply of raw fish to the existing fish-processing factories in Africa and to encourage the establishment of new ones to process the increased fish landings

that are expected to arise from the use of more efficient fishing gear. In addition, local landings can provide an important source of on-shore employment. These activities could have a ripple effect on the local economy, leading to the establishment of ancillary industries (e.g., a variety of support services from vessel chandling and metal working to light electrical engineering) that will also encourage other backward and forward linkages. Ideally, also, shore-based fish processing could generate a demand for cans and packing materials, and for agricultural inputs in the final fish product (e.g., tomatoes); and through certain input industries for fish processing, it could stimulate new items for export, for example, canned agricultural products.⁴⁴

In the last several decades, it must be conceded, there has been considerable industrial development in some countries, such as Senegal, Mauritania, and Namibia, whose fishing companies produce for both export and African markets. Much of this industrialization, however, is weak and for the most part subservient to the foreign fishing companies' interests. It is incapable of leading to a sustained economic and social transformation for the poor, especially for those who depend on the industry for their livelihood. The factories are often controlled by foreign owners, and their products often tend to be mostly for an enclave market of a tiny rich minority of the local middle class. In addition, their modern technologies are often so labor-saving that they employ few people, despite the fact that these local fishing communities generally suffer from high rates of unemployment. These new technologies also tend to disadvantage women, who often dominate the traditional artisanal fisheries owing to the well-known preference for men by many African governmental, foreign direct investment, and international development agencies.⁴⁵ Inappropriate fishing technology defeats its purpose because the companies'

orientation is towards the use of complementary technology based in the home port in Europe (e.g., freezer trawlers serving final product fish processing plants in Europe), which transfers poorly in the [African] economic context (far away from major markets with little local expertise or detailed knowledge of overseas market tastes). As a consequence the present pattern of exploitation of [African] fisheries means the prospects for the development of stronger linkages to the local . . . economy appear limited.⁴⁶

Some of the fish landed are intended for the plants that supply the local market, and since very few of these agreements establish the quality of the fish to be landed, some of the European fishing companies simply dump their by-catch on the African countries. Most do not even land these inferior fish unless forced to do so by their host states.⁴⁷ Senegal stands out clearly as a beneficiary of on-shore employment and increased government revenue from local landings, because it has an established local marketing infrastructure and processing capacity geared to the export market. This has, in turn, given a great boost to local businesses.⁴⁸ In most other signatory countries, very little of the anticipated rural industrialization has materialized, and several fishing villages and fishing ports are still impoverished. Consequently, even "Mauritania has had problems in setting up adequate on-shore facilities, particularly in view of its close proximity to Las Palmas, with which it had to compete. In Guinea-Bissau there has been virtually

no landings from foreign vessels, because the Guineans cannot afford to keep the cold stores operating and have insufficiently trained staff.”⁴⁹

Some fishing companies and the EU have begun to respond to this problem by encouraging rapid modernization of on-shore equipment and boatbuilding, for instance, in Mauritania and Senegal, to adapt this production to the needs of small-scale fishermen. Today, projects for the manufacture of single- or multihull boats of aluminum or fiberglass are being suggested for replacement and extension of the existing fleet, which is assumed to be underequipped. Improvements are also being suggested for modernization of fishing equipment, harbor installations, and the like.⁵⁰ Continuing economic crises and the high costs of these “adaptations” have rendered them too prohibitive for poorer artisans, so that rather than narrowing the income gap, most of the benefits from the new technologies have gone to the local entrepreneurs (and the ruling class) who facilitate the investment of foreign capital, while the artisanal fishers-turned-wage laborers get very little in return. The increasing proletarianization of artisanal fishers confirms the position articulated several years ago by Robert E. Johannes, who argued:

As equipment becomes more sophisticated its price ultimately rises beyond the means of the average fisherman. A new profession, money-lending, materializes to enable him to finance his purchases and he often falls into debt. Employment opportunities diminish as more efficient modern boats drive out native craft. . . . It is part of the oft-repeated sequence of events whereby self-sufficient, internally regulated subsistence economies are converted to money-based economies, governed ultimately by decisions made in market centers thousands of miles away.⁵¹

Most artisanal fishermen and women in these countries cannot even purchase the now-outdated fishing equipment, let alone the newer and invariably more expensive boats being introduced under the scheme just described.

Furthermore, rising costs and depreciating exchange rates have generally forced some small-scale fishermen to abandon their occupation and to seek employment in the export industry or to swell the ranks of the increasingly important informal sector. In Nigeria, for instance, one fishing net cost about ₦500 in 1992; in 1993 its price had skyrocketed to ₦3,000. Other difficulties that have forced many local fishermen to abandon their trade include the perennial scarcity of petrol; high cost of fishing equipment; and inadequate plans for the replenishment of the fisheries, which are now exhausted much more readily than they were before the new technologies were introduced.⁵²

The new technologies have also created discord in fishing communities that has resulted in conflict between large- and small-scale operators. There have also been conflicts within small-scale fishing communities between those who have adopted the technological innovations and those who are unable to do so, all probably linked to the changed rationality in the organization and management of this resource. As fishing becomes more lucrative, more and more people have also been drawn into already overfished coastal waters, leading to increased pressure on the marine environment and to the harvest of very young and poor-quality fish that are generally meant for the local market.

Employment and Training of Local Personnel. There are about one million African fishermen—mainly in Ghana, Egypt, Chad, and Mali—a number that

leads to overcrowding in fisheries that are not particularly rich. For each 1,000 metric tons of fish produced, there are 1,200 fishermen in Mali; 1,125 in Nigeria; 766 in Mexico; 80 in the United States; 43 in France; and 18 in Norway. Half of these African fishermen earn their livelihood from continental (coastal) fishing, and three-quarters are craftsmen.⁵³ Industrial fishing, on the other hand, has done little to encourage employment. Whatever jobs have been created tend to be concentrated in Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, Namibia, and Senegal, and many of the openings are still filled by foreigners. In Morocco, industrial fishing employs 30,000 people in 38 companies and 84 factories. Small-scale fishing accounts for only 5 percent of Mauritanian total catch landed. In many countries, the fish-processing industry faces major problems including the high cost of imported cans and the low quality of oil for preservation. These constraints have made it uneconomical to employ more workers.⁵⁴

As noted already, the introduction of advanced technologies has also resulted in a reduction in employment in the marine sector as subsidized capital replaces manual labor. This is particularly true of Senegal, where the introduction of new fishing technologies (subsidized by the EU and the government of Senegal) caused a severe rural exodus that almost crippled fishing activities in the Casamance region in the 1980s.⁵⁵ In response to the huge problem created by this development, the French Development Fund (CFD) in 1986 began to support the implementation of the *projet de développement maritime artisanal* (PAMEZ) with an estimated FFfr 101.9 million grant from the French Cooperation Ministry. In 1994, CFD allocated the sum of FFfr 8 million to the second phase of PAMEZ, which focuses on infrastructure and training, all with the objective of remedying the crisis affecting the fishing sector resulting from the influx of more fishers into the region. Ultimately, the program seeks to create a fishing policy that is compatible with sustainable development of Senegal's fishery resources.⁵⁶

The results of some of the training provisions of the fishing agreements have also not been encouraging. For instance, in Mauritania, instead of taking on board a "shadow" Mauritanian trainee crew,

the EC boats en masse paid the Mauritanian trainees to stay on land. Eventually, the training provisions . . . became little more than a social welfare scheme for those lucky enough to benefit from being granted a place on the scheme.

While this may be an extreme example of the inadequacy of on-board training provisions, it is broadly replicated in other [African] states. Where trainees are taken on board often no vocational training actually takes place with the trainees being used only for menial work (deck cleaning, kitchen hand work, etc.).⁵⁷

It is even worse with training undertaken in European-based training institutes. The experience of some Namibian Sea Fisheries inspectors who were on a six-month training program in Europe in 1993 is a clear example of the lack of European commitment to these treaty provisions. According to one report on Namibians who were frustrated with their training in Europe:

The inspectors who had been on this course . . . expressed doubts about its value in providing them with the necessary training to do an inspection job. The course had comprised 3 months of Italian language training and 3 months of marine training which in the words of one inspector was "teaching

people how to become an Italian fisherman.” It was felt that very little was transferred or even available on: surveillance techniques; catch report mechanism; the monitoring and protection of resources; or the specific characteristics of Namibia’s fishery. The over-riding impression which the trainee inspectors gained was that given the size of the fish being landed in Europe, the EC fisheries conservation policy was not to be emulated.⁵⁸

Because of the repeated frustration and abuse they received at the hands of their Italian “teachers,” the Namibian trainee inspectors refused to go back for the one-year course, which, as it was an integral part of the EU-financed training program, a number of the inspectors had planned to undertake in order to acquire the skills to teach other inspectors.

Funding for Scientific and Technical Programs. According to one review of the technical provisions of the fishing agreements whose objective is to support African countries in the monitoring and control of fishing activities, these provisions “are little more than minimum level compromises designed to place little or no constraints on the fishing activities of EC vessels legally allowed access.”⁵⁹ In addition, the scientific and technical programs tend to emphasize the needs of European industrial fishing companies rather than the needs of the over one million African fishermen and women.

Overall, one cannot deny that some changes have been made in the wording of the Euro-African fishing agreements. In reality, however, few changes have occurred in European attitudes and perceptions about Africa’s fisheries. Except for some very conscientious governments, mainly Namibia and Senegal, many other African states appear to be content with the minimal rents and license fees they now receive. Some have even turned the supervision of the fisheries sector and the award of licenses into another opportunity for political patronage and personal/sectional aggrandizement.⁶⁰

Suggestions for Sustainable Management of Africa’s Fisheries

In this section, a number of policy options that could help to stem the dangerous trends identified in the preceding section will be discussed. None of the policy options can independently arrest the deterioration of African fisheries; success can only come if the alternative policies are seen as mutually reinforcing of one another.

Limiting Access to the Resources. One strategy that should be tried is the introduction of a form of *long-term exclusive use rights* that would limit access to the fishery resources and replace the present system in which the DWFNs are subsidized (by allowing them to pay extremely low rents) to overfish the existing stocks. Indeed, it has been suggested that “only when fishermen believe that they are assured a long-term and exclusive right to a fishery are they likely to manage it in the same far-sighted way as good farmers manage their land.”⁶¹ It is possible that this strategy could lead to a situation where administrative allocation of exclusive use rights benefits one set of users at the expense of another set, especially since the decision on the allocation of use rights—essentially a distribution of wealth—would generally have to be made at a political level. In other words, the potential for patrimonialism decried earlier could increase.

Another potential difficulty would be how to determine where the management functions could be best fulfilled and what the role of government should be relative to that of the fishers as a group. Finally, access controls could have short-term effects on employment; in the long-term, however, controlling access would increase net economic revenues, which could be invested in other employment-generating activities.⁶² These problems notwithstanding, one could argue that justice or equity may not be the main concerns in choosing the optimal strategy that would ultimately lead to sustainable development of the fisheries in the interest of the majority of African peoples. The primary consideration should be the stemming of the catastrophe that has already set in.

A second option under this approach would be the *adoption of more innovative management measures*. This option requires an increased understanding of biological resources in the context of their environment. Second, it requires that more attention be given to the social and economic factors governing the behavior and strategies of those using the resources. Such new management regimes should in the long run direct Africa's fisheries development toward the growth of the local market, which requires support for the craft-fishing sector, substitution of local for foreign fleets, adding value to fish products, and providing efficient distribution systems.

In countries like Namibia, where some of their fish stocks tend to stay put (as opposed to the migratory or transboundary species), exclusive rights could be allocated through auctioning off chunks of the seabed. This is similar to the exclusive rights granted to oil prospecting companies to drill for oil. There has also been some suggestion that individual quotas—sometimes called individual transferable quotas (ITQs)—could be set, and fishermen would be allowed to trade them, with the possibility that some could actually cash in the quotas and leave the sea. These approaches would tend to make fishermen act like owners and not like hunters. "They [would] voluntarily [help] to finance the policing of valuable inshore . . . fisheries."⁶³

Increase in Fines. A second major change in strategy would be to increase the amount of fines imposed on all those who violate sustainable fisheries management regimes. The present practice of imposing fines that are less than a tenth of the value of total fish caught by poachers or those who ignore regulations sends a negative message to these fishermen and their sponsors. As some have recently suggested: "Fishermen should pay society for the privilege of catching fish, not vice versa. In fact few governments charge even foreign fishermen for the right to fish in their waters, and those that do set the price too low: typically, around 5% of the value of the catch."⁶⁴ Revenue from the increase in fines should facilitate the state's role in preventing or curtailing poaching and in ensuring a sensible husbandry of the resources.

Improvement in Enforcement Capabilities. The difficulty with effective and efficient management of resources does not result from fishermen's stupidity, but from the inherent incentives in extant management regimes to overfish. Merely introducing legislation will be met with attempts by fishermen to twist the rules or cheat as the example of the activities of Spanish fishing companies in

Moroccan waters clearly demonstrates.⁶⁵ This is why an improvement in enforcement capabilities has become imperative for African fisheries managers. According to one observer, "If regulation is to work, it must be supported by effective surveillance and heavy penalties."⁶⁶ One approach is to equip surveillance ships with electronic sensors and signals to detect illegal fishing activities. There must also be increased monitoring of fishing vessels by satellite to check their location and routes. More better-trained and well-remunerated inspectors should be positioned both on shipboard and on shore to check on the excesses of the European fishing companies. A team to observe the inspectors themselves would also not be a bad idea.

Some governments could point to a lack of the facilities and resources necessary to strictly enforce their fishing laws. This is a valid argument, as the experience of four West African countries in 1993 shows. From August to December of that year, Lux Development, a Luxemburg-based company, with assistance from the World Bank, embarked on a regional aerial surveillance of fishing in the territorial waters of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and The Gambia. The exercise identified the number of vessels fishing in the region, where exactly they fished, how many were licensed vessels (according to information from the countries), and how many were pirate vessels plundering the wealth of the defenseless countries. Through sophisticated aerial photographs and other means Lux Development hoped to establish a data base (the first in the region's history) that would be compiled into a book for the recipient countries and international donor countries. For 800 hours at US \$1,500 per hour, this operation cost a total of \$1.2 million, an amount these countries could hardly afford individually, since they faced other, more pressing demands on their scarce resources.⁶⁷

On the other hand, a budgetary-constraints argument has often been used by the political and administrative classes to cover up their lack of political will to effectively enforce national and international fishing legislation. It may also be an attempt to hide the fact that state officials are often part of the problem. World Bank fisheries adviser Edouardo Loayza, speaking at the Third Fisheries Development Donor Consultation meeting in Paris in 1994, observed that top government officials in West Africa collaborate with shipowners to defraud their motherland. More bluntly, he stated, "We have seen how the navy becomes a part of the corrupt team that receives hard currency and turns a blind eye to the looting of their nation's wealth."⁶⁸

Namibia's experience since it attained independence in 1990, however, attests to the fact that African countries are able to effectively enforce these laws. After the declaration of a 200-mile EEZ and a temporary halting of fishing activities shortly after independence, Namibia in 1991 began a new but controlled expansion of its fishing activities. The new government quickly established and enforced fishing quotas—total allowable catches (TACs)—that have resulted in the replenishment of its fish stocks, which had been seriously depleted during South Africa's colonialism in the country. This policy has been largely successful. For instance, the TAC for hake has since been increased from 60,000 metric tons (mt)

in 1990 and 1991 to 90,000 mt for 1992 and 120,000 mt for 1993. The pilchard TAC has seen a similar development, going from 40,000 mt in 1990 to 60,000 mt in 1991, 90,000 mt in 1992, and 115,000 mt in 1993.

There were other significant improvements in terms of employment, revenue, and backward and forward linkages. The government has also indicated that it will “maintain the adopted policy and [will] continue conservation pressure in order to ensure further growth with the objective of achieving maximum sustainable yields (MSYs).”⁶⁹ There have been corresponding increases in the amount of revenue accruing to the state from the fishing sector. In 1991, for instance, the total landed value of Namibia’s fish was estimated at about R600 (US\$240) million; by 1994, its value had already exceeded N\$1 billion (US \$400 million), a total originally expected only by the year 2000. Revenue earned by the government from licenses alone was R150 million in 1991 and is expected to grow to R250 million in ten years’ time—an amount equivalent to about 2.5 percent of Namibia’s GDP in 1993.⁷⁰ By 1994, the value of fisheries exports had grown to more than N\$900 million per year, accounting for 27.7 percent of total merchandise exports in 1994 (5.3 percent in 1989). Employment in the industry has doubled from 6,000 at independence to some 12,000 in 1994 and it is expected to increase to more than 15,000 in the next 5 to 8 years. Not surprisingly, the fisheries contribution to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) almost doubled from 3.9 percent in 1991 to 7.6 percent in 1994.⁷¹ All this was achieved with the help of foreign donors, of course; but the bulk of the job was done by a fledgling marine fisheries bureaucracy in a new nation. Many African countries with very rich marine fisheries such as Ghana, Nigeria, the Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Mozambique could attain a similar level of success, regardless of their human and financial limitations, if the political authorities were willing to enforce their laws.⁷²

Diversification of Fishing-Agreements Partners and Privatization. More options might be available if the coastal states entered into and/or strengthened fishing agreements, partnerships, and joint ventures on an equal footing not only with Europeans, but also with high fish consumer countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Also, since the bureaucracy in Africa often tends to be politicized, partnerships and joint ventures often turn into opportunities for patronage and personal enrichment. Hence, there is an urgent need to allow more indigenous private sector initiatives in these agreements and joint ventures/partnerships. The ideal developmental state would therefore facilitate the enforcement of such agreements by setting standards of productivity by which government and foreign donors’ support for indigenous operators can be determined. Namibia’s celebrated success did not arise through state ownership of fishing enterprises, but through effective governance and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector to manage the industry.⁷³ No matter how ingenious new fishery management strategies are, their implementation will be obviated so long as the state continues to participate in this sector as an entrepreneur acting against the interests of indigenous fishing companies.

Marine Regionalism. Finally, the implementation of some of the preceding recommendations would impose a tremendous burden on many African countries

whose fishery reserves may not be rich enough to warrant such huge investments. Besides, since most of the countries have short coastlines and rather limited territorial waters, it might not be cost-efficient to install such expensive security gadgets only to see them lying idle or underutilized. The proximity of the coastal states to one another could also mean that the efforts of neighboring countries would duplicate each other and waste scarce resources. One oft-repeated solution to these problems would be to adopt marine regionalism and harmonization of fishing policies, just as the European Union adopted a common fishing policy in 1983. In addition to resolving the problems just identified, marine regionalism would give African countries the balance of bargaining power when they entered into fishing agreements with DWFNs, and especially with the EU. Individually, there is very little these countries could do to obtain advantageous agreements since they know that the European nations and other DWFNs could enter into similar fishing agreements with other ever-ready countries in the region. Collectively, however, they could present a united front and extract not only more benefits from the agreements but also more compliance with their marine resource regulations. Such collaboration would greatly help them to achieve optimal management of their fishery resources.

Under the auspices and the encouragement of the EU, a ministerial-level conference held in Libreville, Gabon, in November 1983 discussed the establishment of a regional fisheries organization for the countries along the Gulf of Guinea. Participants agreed to harmonize their national fishing regulations and management as well as fishing operations. They also agreed to establish a marine fisheries research center, a regional school for marine fisheries, and an artisanal fishing center with an ice plant and a repair shop for small-boat motors. These proposals never got off the ground; instead, most of the countries in the region have established some of the listed facilities, which have become either underutilized, underfunded, or grossly mismanaged. Ironically, most of the "national projects" were funded by the same foreign governments and multilateral lending institutions that have always recommended regional cooperation and harmonization of policies to African countries.⁷⁴ Like other attempts at functional regionalism in Africa, marine regionalism continues to be as much a recurring theme of resolutions and declarations as it has been an elusive goal.

Often those states that have richer fisheries are able to strike harder bargains, whether with fellow Africans or with outsiders, and thus to gain a larger share of the benefits for themselves. This fact gives them less incentive to cooperate and harmonize their policies with other African states, and they undertake to do so only incidentally, when they see such actions as serving their interests.⁷⁵ This approach cannot continue for much longer since the potential benefits of cooperation are great. For verification one has only to look at the prosperity of the South Pacific states and of other places that have developed marine regionalism based essentially on the harmonization of access regimes and the formulation of regionwide access fisheries.

A step in the right direction to curtail this lack of regional cooperation was recently taken by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) when

it established a Marine Fisheries Co-ordinating Unit in Windhoek, Namibia. One proposal it adopted to advance member states' subregional integration agenda in this sector is the organization of regional trade fairs to bring together small- and large-scale fishing companies in southern Africa for the purpose of encouraging and facilitating technical cooperation, technology transfer, trade, joint ventures, training, and development of regional approaches to fisheries management and fish development.⁷⁶ Other subregional groupings could adopt similar measures not only for political advantage but also for economies of scale in terms of enforcement of fishing regulations.

Efforts must also be made to create subregional organizations of *private sector* interests who could invest in shipbuilding, fishing, repair, and processing. If locally determined technological needs are provided for, these private sector interests would be in a better position to solve the problem of inadequate transfer of technology from the DWFNs. Besides, regional groupings *spearheaded by the private sector*, but supported by African governments, could establish new and/or rehabilitate existing marine fisheries training institutes, marketing organizations, and management forums to eliminate the perpetuation of dependency that the Euro-African shipping agreements appear to have foisted on Africa.

Summary and Conclusions

This study has argued that the basic premise of the Euro-African fishing agreements since the late 1970s—a premise focusing on the availability of cheap fish for Europe and access rent for African coastal states—does not encourage the sustainable development and management of the region's fisheries. The convergence of domestic and foreign institutional and class interests in the accumulation process in the industry has undermined the efficacy of these agreements (except in a few countries) as a commendable development strategy. Specifically, an analysis of the most important fishing agreements revealed that they have resulted in a further widening of income gaps; personal enrichment of facilitators of foreign capital investment and public officials; and greater marginalization for local fishermen and women, particularly in the artisanal fisheries. Most of the benefits have also tended to flow to EU-based fishing companies, while inadequate enforcement of regulations has given rise to an alarming increase in illegal fishing activities.

The study therefore suggested several options for better development and management of the region's fisheries. These include long-term exclusive use rights, stiffening of fines and other punishments for piracy and willful violation of fishing and conservation regulations, improved enforcement capabilities, diversification of agreement partners, divestiture of state fishing activities, and renewed efforts for the creation of an indigenous private sector-led marine regionalism. Namibia, which has experienced notable success in the management of its fisheries resources since its independence in 1990, was discussed as a model worthy of emulation by other African coastal states, despite all the financial and human-resource constraints they will confront in the process.

NOTES

1. In order to avoid confusion, I have chosen to use the acronym EU throughout, even though some of the references refer to the European Community (EC) period.
2. Gerald S. Posner and Jon G. Sutinen, *Overfished Stocks, Undernourished People, and Underbenefited Coastal States of Western Africa: Opportunities for Marine Fisheries Management and Development* (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 1984).
3. See, for instance, Francis T. Christy, Jr., *Economic Benefits and Arrangements with Foreign Fishing Countries in the Northern Subregion of CEEAF: A Preliminary Assessment*, CEEAF (Committee on Eastern Central Atlantic Fisheries)/EEAF Series/79/19 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] and United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 1979); Jon G. Sutinen, R. B. Pollnac, and H. P. Josserand, *The Fisheries of West Africa and Prospects for Development*, ICMRD Working Paper No. 6 (Providence: International Center for Marine Resource Development [ICMRD], University of Rhode Island, 1981); and David Gibbs, "The Politics of Economic Development: The Case of the Mauritanian Fishing Industry," *African Studies Review* 27 (December 1984): 79–83.
4. One biologist admits that fisheries scientists "have been trained and employed because of our interest in the science and technology of fish and fishing. We have avoided the messy, frustrating, non-scientific problems of fishing. More emphasis must be given to the social, political, cultural, and economic aspects of fisheries." See Roy I. Jackson, "Donor-Assisted International Fisheries Development," in *The State of the World's Fisheries Resources: Proceedings of the World Fisheries Congress, Plenary Sessions*, ed. Clyde W. Voigtlander (Lebanon, NH: International Science Publisher, 1994), p. 120.
5. Two important exceptions are Senegal and Namibia, where a significant proportion of society has benefited from the fisheries sector. See Jean-Pierre Chaveau and Alassane Samba, "Market Development, Government Intervention, and the Dynamics of the Small-Scale Fishing Sector: An Historical Perspective of the Senegalese Case," *Development and Change* 20 (October 1989): 599–620; and C. Blatt, ed., *Focus on Fisheries and Research: Namibia Brief No. 18* (Windhoek: Namibia Foundation, June 1994).
6. See the FAO's 525-page *Regional Compendium of Fisheries Legislation, West Africa (CEEAF) Region*, Legislative Study No. 27 (Rome: FAO, 1983); and FAO, *Coastal State Requirements for Foreign Fishing* (Rome: Development Law Service, FAO, 1993).
7. Lewis E. Queirolo and Richard S. Johnston, "Distant Water Fishing Nations and Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction," *Marine Policy* 13 (January 1989): 16. For some African analyses based on this logic, see A. O. Ezenekwe, "Nigeria Develops Fishing to Meet Food Demand," *Fishing News International* 13, no. 9 (1974): 42–49; E. Bayagbona, "Fisheries in Nigeria," *Nigerian Trade Journal* 21, no. 1 (1975): 6–12; "Nigeria Plans Large Fishing Fleet Expansion," *Marine Fisheries Review* 44 (May 1982): 28–29; and "Mauritania, Senegal Push Fishing Rights," *African Business*, no. 49, September 1982, pp. 49–55.
8. Lee G. Anderson, *The Economics of Fisheries Management* (Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
9. On the impediments to the implementation of the new fisheries and ocean resources regimes contained in UNCLOS III in the African Atlantic coastal states, see S. K. B. Mfodwo, B. M. Tsamenyi, and S. K. N. Blay, "The Exclusive Economic Zone: State Practice in the African Atlantic Region," *Ocean Development and International Law* 20, no. 5 (1989): 445–99.
10. George Kent, "Fisheries Politics in the South Pacific," in *Ocean Yearbook* 2, ed. Elisabeth M. Borgese and Norton Ginsberg (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 363. See also George Kent, "Equity in Global Fisheries Management," *Oceans* 10 (September–October 1977): 60–64.
11. For a sampling of this debate, see J. A. Crutchfield and R. Lawson, "West African Marine Fisheries: Alternatives for Management" (RFF/PISFA Paper 3, Washington, DC, 1974); G. V. Everett, *The Northwest African Fishery: Problems of Management and Development*, CEEAF Technical Report 6/E (Rome: FAO, 1978); J. Domingo, "Deux Expériences de Développement de la

Pêche Maritime au Sénégal," *Cahiers d'Outre-Mer* 35, no. 137 (1982): 35–62; and Gibbs, "Politics of Economic Development."

12. Queirolo and Johnston, "Distant Water Fishing Nations," pp. 17–18.

13. Richard S. Johnston and James R. Wilson, "Interdependences among Fisheries Management, Fisheries Trade, and Fisheries Development: Experience with Extended Jurisdiction," *Marine Fisheries Review* 49 (March 1987).

14. Stephen R. Crutchfield, "Estimation of Foreign Willingness to Pay for United States Fishery Resources: Japanese Demand for Alaska Pollock," *Land Economics* 59, no. 1 (1983): 16–23.

15. Kent, "Fisheries Politics in the South Pacific," p. 369.

16. Some of the most notable studies include Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1974); Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10 (December 1972): 503–24; E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Development in East Africa* (London: Heinemann, 1973); and Claude Ake, *A Political Economy of Africa* (London: Longman, 1981).

17. One country that specifically adopted the comparative advantage strategy was Côte d'Ivoire. See Neil B. Ridler, "Comparative Advantage as a Developmental Model—the Ivory Coast," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 23 (September 1985): 407–17.

18. Queirolo and Johnston, "Distant Water Fishing Nations," p. 19. These arrangements, in West Africa, are analyzed in Lawrence Christy, Robert McManus, Robin Rakowe, and Henri Rambaud, *International Joint Ventures in Fisheries: Case Studies from West Africa* (CECAF Region) (Rome: FAO, 1983).

19. Gordon R. Munro, "The Economics of Coastal State-Distant Water National Cooperation Arrangements: Some Long Run Considerations," *Marine Policy* 9, no. 1 (1989): 2–15.

20. Howard Schissel, "The Rape of the Seas: How the Fishing Invaders Strip Africa," *South*, no. 30, April 1983, pp. 68–69; Mfodwo, Tsamenyi, and Blay, "Exclusive Economic Zone," pp. 459–67; and Christy, Jr., *Economic Benefits and Arrangements with Foreign Fishing Countries*, pp. 9–11.

21. Kent, "Fisheries Politics in the South Pacific," p. 375.

22. For instance, on 6 April 1995, Namibia disclosed the European Union's threat to cut off its lucrative European fish export market (of about N\$1 billion annually) if Namibia failed to meet a 31 December 1995 deadline to improve its fish-processing standards. An evaluation mission to Walvis Bay in March 1995 had found unacceptable hygiene and quality controls, and it promised to undertake further spot inspections later to determine whether the recommended changes had been undertaken. See "EU Fishing Issues," *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 16 March–15 April 1995, p. 12079.

23. See Gibbs, "Politics of Economic Development;" and Vlad M. Kaczynski, "Foreign Fishing Fleets in the SubSaharan West African EEZ," *Marine Policy* 13 (January 1989): 2–15.

24. See Schissel, "Rape of the Seas," pp. 68–69.

25. See P. Copes, "The Backward-Bending Supply Curve of the Fishing Industry," *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 17 (1970): 69–77; James R. Coull, "The Background to the Icelandic Fishing Dispute," *Aberdeen University Review* 45 (1974): 359–68; Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries (J. L. Kirby, Chairman), *Navigating Troubled Waters: A New Policy for the Atlantic Fisheries* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1982); Robert L. Stokes, "Prospects for Foreign Fishing Vessels in US Fisheries Development," *Marine Policy* 4 (January 1980): 33–41; and K. M. Sullivan "Conflict in the Management of a Northwest Atlantic Transboundary Cod Stock," *Marine Policy* 13 (April 1989): 118–36. A most recent dramatic example of fishing nationalism is the "fish war" between Canada and Spain-EU in 1995 over the halibut fisheries in the Canadian maritimes.

26. Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements, *The Battle for Fish Conference* (Brussels: Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements, 1992), p. 1 (hereafter *Battle for Fish Conference*).

27. See "EC, African Nations Expand Fisheries Ties," *Marine Fisheries Review* 46 (Summer 1984): 92.

28. See, for example, Robin Churchill, "The EEC Fisheries Policy—towards a Revision," *Marine Policy* 1 (January 1977): 26–36.

29. "EC, African Nations Expand Fisheries Ties," p. 93.

30. See Chris Ejimofor, "European Fishermen Ravage the West Coast of Africa: Time to Check Fish Piracy," *West Africa*, 17–23 April 1995, p. 594.
31. "Namibia-Germany: Fishing Deal," *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 16 November–15 December 1991, p. 10613. Indeed, 25 percent of the EU's fish is now caught outside its waters, and around 75 percent of its fish imports are obtained through fisheries agreements. See Ejimofor, "European Fishermen Ravage the West Coast of Africa," p. 594.
32. See *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 31 March 1985, p. 7633; and Jean Carroz and Michel Savini, "Les Accords de Pêche Conclues par les Etats Africains Riverains de l'Atlantique," *Annuaire Française de Droit International* 1983 (Paris, 1984).
33. *Battle for Fish Conference*, p. 2.
34. "Namibia: Fish Stocks Double," *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 16 May–15 June 1993, p. 11158.
35. For some of the critiques, see Posner and Sutinen, *Overfished Stocks, Undernourished People*; and Thomas Goffinet, "Development and Fisheries Management: The Case of Northwest Africa," *Ocean and Coastal Management* 17, no. 2 (1992): 105–36.
36. This summary of the provisions of recent agreements is adapted from *Battle for Fish Conference*, p. 3; and FAO, *Regional Compendium of Fisheries Legislation*; and Fao, *Coastal State Requirements for Foreign Fishing*.
37. World Bank, *Namibia: Poverty Alleviation with Sustainable Growth* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992), pp. 48; 50.
38. Many of the figures used in the preceding discussion are from the European Court of Auditors' Report as summarized in Franois Misser, "Who Gains from Euro-Africa Fishing Agreements?" *African Business*, no. 185, February 1994, p. 27. For further information on Seychelles fisheries, see *Technical Cooperation Programme, Fisheries Economics, and Planning Assistance to the Seychelles Fishing Authority*, UNDP Project Reports, SEY/86/005/ROI, 1992 (Geneva: UNDP, 1992).
39. "EU Fishing Issues."
40. Misser, "Who Gains from Euro-Africa Fishing Agreements," pp. 27–28.
41. A number of studies have detailed this form of denial of benefits to the underprivileged by the modern African state in the fisheries sector. See, for instance, Melvin K. Hendrix, "African Maritime Fisheries in the West Atlantic: An Historical Overview and Case Study," *New England Journal of Black Studies* 1, no. 3 (1983): 78–102; Gibbs, "Politics of Economic Development"; and Chaveau and Samba, "Market Development," pp. 610–17.
42. Quoted in *Battle for Fish Conference*, p. 4.
43. For a concise account of this aspect of the EU Common Fisheries Policy of 1983, see Robin R. Churchill, *EEC Fisheries Law* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 110–12.
44. *Battle for Fish Conference*, pp. 4, 9.
45. For a very insightful but dated account of the marginalization of women through improved technology, see Economic Commission for Africa, *Women in the Artisanal Fishing Industry in Senegal and Ghana* (Addis Ababa: United Nations, 1984).
46. *Battle for Fish Conference*, p. 9.
47. One of Mozambique's foreign fishing license conditions is that all by-catches in shrimp fisheries must be landed in Maputo port. See FAO, *Coastal State Requirements for Foreign Fishing*, Legislative Study No. 21, Rev. 4 (Rome: FAO, 1993), p. 212.
48. *Battle for Fish Conference*, p. 5. For more detailed studies, see Cheikh Ndiaye, Niokhor Diouf, and Mouhamadou Diop (under the direction of Bernad Founou-Tchuigoua), *The Food Industry in Senegal: With Particular Reference to the Processing of Grains, Fisheries Products, and Milk Products* (Geneva: United Nations, 1985; 1986 printing); El Hadji Malik Diop, *Les Coopératives de Pêche Artisanale au Sénégal: Diagnostic Organisationnel du Centre Coopérative de Mareyage de Kayar* (Sherbrooke, Quebec: Institut de Recherche et d'Enseignement pour les Coopératives de l'Université de Sherbrooke, 1987); and Francis Laloe, *Le Pêche Artisanale au Sénégal: Resource et Stratégies de Pêche* (Paris: Editions de l'ORSTOM, 1990).
49. *Battle for Fish Conference*, p. 5.

50. "Fishing Industry in Mauritania," *Partnership* (Brussels), no. 6, March–April 1993, p. 7. This publication is an insert in the *Courier*, March/April 1993 issue, a monthly publication of EU-ACP Cooperation Office in Brussels, Belgium.

51. Robert E. Johannes, "Traditional Marine Conservation Methods in Oceania and Their Demise," *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics* 9 (1978): 349–64.

52. See "Fishermen Suffer Setback," *Guardian* (Lagos), 27 August 1993, p. 8. Also, see Ade Olomola, *Rubber and Fishing Industries under Structural Adjustment Programme* (Ibadan: Nigerian Institute for Social Research, 1992). On the problems and prospects of artisanal and inshore fisheries resulting from structural adjustment, see UNDP/FAO, *Report of Evaluation Mission to Nigeria*, Project Report for Artisanal and Inshore Fisheries Development, NIR/77/001/RO1 (Geneva: UNDP/FAO, 1984); and UNDP/FAO, *Artisanal and Inshore Fisheries Development in Nigeria*, Project Report, NIR/77/001/R02 (Geneva: UNDP/FAO, 1990).

53. "African Fisheries: Riches within Reach," *South African Shipping News and Fishing Review* 48 (November–December 1993): 27.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 28. In Namibia, most workers in the fisheries work in industrial fishing. This is because of the country's apartheid heritage during which the "natives" were prevented from engaging in private business, including the fishing industry. Since 1990, the state has begun to encourage and assist Africans to participate in fisheries as owners and managers. See A. Tordesillas, "Namibianisation Misunderstood by Many," in *Focus on Fisheries*, ed. C. Blatt, pp. 53–54.

55. "Fishing: Senegal," *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 16 February–15 March 1994, p. 11616.

56. "African Fisheries: Riches within Reach," p. 27.

57. *Battle for Fish Conference*, pp. 4–5. Indeed, Gibbs, "Politics of Economic Development," pp. 80–81, documented similar practices in Mauritania as far back as 1984.

58. *Battle for Fish Conference*, p. 4.

59. *Battle for Fish Conference*, p. 5.

60. It should be noted that even the Namibian fisheries officials, who have been praised worldwide for revitalizing the country's fisheries after years of neglect by South Africa, are not completely unaffected by this trend. In 1993, the government released the report of the Mr. Justice Bryan O'Linn Commission of Inquiry into allegations of corruption and maladministration in the country's fisheries. Although the commission exonerated the officials, it did so on the grounds that there were "no cases in which criminal prosecution was recommended, or even where additional investigation appeared to be warranted." This conclusion does not necessarily mean that the allegations were totally untrue. See "O'Linn Exonerates Namibian Fisheries Officials," in *Fishing Industry Handbook: South Africa and Namibia 1994*, 22d ed. (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Marine Information cc, 1994), p. 98.

61. "The Catch about Fish," *Economist* (London), 19 March 1994, p. 13.

62. These constraints are discussed in World Bank, *Fish for the Future: Summary Report: A Study of International Fisheries Research* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), p. 3.

63. "Fish: The Tragedy of the Oceans," *Economist*, 19 March 1994, p. 24. See also I. N. Clark, P. J. Major, and N. Mollet, "The Development and Implementation of New Zealand's ITQ Management System," in *Rights Based Fishing*, ed. P. A. Neher, R. Arnanson, and N. Mollet (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), pp. 117–45.

64. "Catch about Fish," p. 13.

65. See "Morocco-EU Fishing Impasse," *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 8 June 1995, p. 12117; "Morocco-EU Fishing Stalemate . . . Again," *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 13 July 1995, p. 12151; and "Morocco: Euro-trawling," *Africa Confidential*, 22 September 1995, p. 8.

66. Quoted in "Fish: Tragedy of the Oceans," p. 24.

67. This operation is described in greater detail in George Ola-Davis, "Policing West Africa's Coastal Waters: Foreigners Violate Fishing Rules," *West Africa* (London), 6 12 June 1994, p. 1011.

68. *Ibid.* In fairness to some of the subregion's small navies, one should note that a shortage of funds, the uncooperative attitude of foreign and local fishermen, and a lack of vessels and equipment have been a major hindrance to their coast-guard functions. See, for instance, the pitiful

condition of even the Nigerian Navy as described by the former Flag Officer Commanding the Western Naval Command, Rear Admiral Suleiman Sa'idu, and quoted in an article by Eunice Damisa, "We Do Not Maintain, We Repair—Admiral Sa'idu," *National Concord* (Lagos), 1 June 1993, p. A3.

69. Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, *Report on Activities 1991–1992 Presented to the Donors Consultative Meeting* (Swakopmund, Namibia: Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, 1993), p. 5. See also Government of Namibia, *Towards Responsible Development of the Fisheries Sector* (Windhoek: Republic of Namibia, 1991).

70. See "Chapter 6: Fisheries," in *Namibia: Poverty Alleviation with Sustainable Growth*, pp. 47–52, 93–94. See also "Namibian Fish Stocks Recovering," *South African Shipping and Fishing Industry Review*, September/October 1993, p. 34.

71. R. Kankondi, "Namibia: Building a Modern Fishing Industry," in *Focus on Fisheries*, ed. C. Blatt, pp. 21–25, 100. See also J. L. Rua, "Sustainable Development and Responsible Fishing," in *Focus on Fisheries*, ed. C. Blatt, pp. 46–49.

72. The FAO recently estimated fish production in West Africa at over 1.5 m tonnes a year. The main regional producer was Ghana (391,700 tonnes), followed by Nigeria (316,330 tonnes), Senegal (299,600), the Côte d'Ivoire (108,940), and Mauritania (91,000). Although nearly four million people in the region live from small-scale fishing (and women play an important role, mainly in marketing the fish), fisheries management and enforcement of regulations in the region are perhaps the weakest in Africa. See "Fishing: West Africa," *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Series), 13 July 1995, p. 12174.

73. See D. Thompson, "Namibia Scores on Effective Management," in *Focus on Fisheries*, ed. C. Blatt, pp. 42–43.

74. For the regional conference described in this paragraph, see "The West African Fisheries Conference," *Marine Fisheries Review* 46 (January/March 1984): 33. In 1989, a Ministerial Conference on Cooperation in Fisheries among the African States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean was inaugurated. It has since adopted a Regional Convention and established a Secretariat in charge of follow-up conferences and implementation of the Regional Convention. Some of the major agreements in the Regional Convention are coordination of national fishing policies for licensing procedures, catch reporting, and monitoring and surveillance; sustainability of yields; and use of appropriate technology. Convention members also agreed to make full use of advanced marine training centers in Africa; promote the exchange of information and the joint negotiation of fisheries agreements concerning the high-seas fleets of non-African countries; accord greater importance to the development of small-scale fishing; improve the living conditions of African fishermen; acknowledge the role of women in fisheries; strengthen fish-marketing and preservation facilities; and facilitate the access of African fishery products to the markets of developed countries. See "Co-operation in Fisheries in Africa" (UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/45/184, 31 February 1991). The severity of the problems of African fisheries highlighted earlier suggests that the time has come to go beyond these declarations and implement them.

75. It has also been argued that this approach to regional issues largely accounts for the collapse or lackluster performance of over 200 attempts at economic regionalism in Africa, including the attempt by West and Central African states to develop indigenous merchant fleets that would have dislodged the continued dominance and control of their deep-sea shipping trade by foreign shipping lines. See Okechukwu C. Iheduru, "Competing Nationalism, Regional Cooperation, and the Politics of International Shipping in West Africa," *Ocean Development and International Law* 24 (April–June 1993): 123–53.

76. See "SADC Marine Fisheries Policy," in *Fishing Industry Handbook: South Africa and Namibia 1994*, p. 99.

